HAZELWOOD RISKED SINKING SHIP AT REEF
TAPES REVEAL CAPTAIN TRIED TO FREE VALDEZ

by STAN JONES and PATTI EPLER
Daily News reporters

VALDEZ- Capt. Joseph Hazelwood risked sinking the tanker Exxon Valdez by trying to haul free from Bligh Reef for more than a hour after his ship's grounding, according to radio messages he sent to the Coast Guard on March 24.

"Right now we're trying just to get her off the reef and we'll get back to you as soon as we can," Hazelwood told the Coast Guard, ignoring warnings that his ship might be too unstable to float.

The tapes also show that oil gushed for nearly three hours from the Valdez's ruptured tanks before the Coast Guard was told of the magnitude of the catastrophe. And when Coast Guard Cmdr. Steve McCall received the transmission at 3:19 a.m. on March 24 from an unidentified radio operator that "138,000" had leaked, he glumly assumed the worst.

"Roger on that, and that was barrels, correct?" McCall asked.

"That's correct," said the Valdez.

Over the next day, more than 10 million gallons of North Slope crude oil or 240,000 barrels would pour from the 987foot tanker.

The recordings raise questions about the activity on board the Valdez around the time it struck Bligh Reef, including an unexplained "problem" that Hazelwood claimed to be having with third mate Gregory Cousins after the wreck, and conversations that have lead investigators to wonder whether Hazelwood knew his position when he came aground.

The tapes, which were made available under the Freedom of Information Act to the Daily News last week, are an official recording of radio calls between the Coast Guard's radarequipped vessel tracking center in Valdez and the ships it was controlling.

As a matter of routine, the Coast Guard recorded all messages from the center to the Exxon Valdez and other ships that were in the area when the disaster unfolded. Copies of the same tapes are under review by National Transportation Safety Board personnel investigating the accident.

Hazelwood's ship struck the reef at 12:04 a.m., according to investigators from the Coast Guard and the NTSB, who have interviewed some crew members and have seized the ship's log and position and engine recorders. Unexplained so far is why Hazelwood waited some 23 minutes to inform the Coast Guard of the collision.

"We've fetched up hard aground north of Goose Island off Bligh Reef," Hazelwood said at 12:27 a.m., according to a time signal automatically recorded on the tape. And then, in the understatement of the night, Hazelwood added, "Evidently we're leaking some oil and we're going to be here for a while."

The operator didn't ask for, and Hazelwood didn't volunteer, details of the grounding.

Coast Guard commander called in

By 1:07 a.m., McCall, the Coast Guard commander in Valdez, had been rousted from bed to deal with the crisis and had taken command at the radar center.

McCall asked for a situation report. Hazelwood revealed that he was trying to free the ship under its own power.

"We're working our way off the reef," Hazelwood said. "We've, ah, the vessel has been holed and we're ascertaining, right now we're trying just to get her off the reef and we'll get back to you as soon as we can."

"Take it slow and easy," McCall advised. "You know, I'm telling you the obvious, but take it slow and easy, and we're getting help out as fast as we can."

Then he asked Hazelwood for "stability info," referring to whether the ship had sustained enough damage, lost enough oil or taken on enough water to be in danger of sinking or breaking up.

"We're (in) pretty good shape right now, stabilitywise, and, ah, trying to extract her off the shoal here," Hazelwood said. "You can probably see me on your radar, and, ah, once we get under way, I'll let you know, do another damage control assessment."

McCall again urged caution on Hazelwood.

"Before you make any drastic attempt to get away, make sure you don't, you know, start doing any ripping," McCall said. "You got a rising tide, you, another, about an hour and a half worth of tide in your favor, ah, ah, once you hit that max, I wouldn't recommend doing much wiggling."

"Major damage has kind of been done and we kind of rock and rolled over it," Hazelwood said. "We're just kind of hung up on the stern here. We're just, ah, we'll drift over it. Ah, I'll get back to you."

"Captain of the port out," McCall said.

The tape doesn't reveal when Hazelwood gave up on refloating the tanker. But when McCall radioed again at 1:59 a.m. to see if the captain was still trying, someone not Hazelwood responded that the engines were stopped.

Survival suits required on board

The standard procedure when a ship goes hard aground on a rocky bottom is to wait for help, McCall said in an interview last week. Because of the Valdez's ruptured tanks and attendant loss of buoyancy, McCall felt, it was too risky to let the ship float free.

"In my opinion, if it had slid off the reef, it would have sunk," McCall said.

The ship's crew and computers were saying exactly the same thing as state environmental officials boarded the Valdez later that morning. When Dan Lawn, the Department of Environmental Conservation's Valdez supervisor, arrived about 3:30 a.m., the tanker was shifting, groaning and creaking.

"I could feel it moving under me," said Lawn, who immediately went to work trying to determine how much oil had poured out of the ruptured tanks.

Joe LeBeau, who works in DEC's Wasilla office, was handed a survival suit by the crew when he arrived at the tanker about 11:30 a.m. The source of their fear was a computer analysis of the ship's stability.

"They were convinced if it popped off the rock we'd have a heck of a time getting off," LeBeau said. "They predicted 30 to 90 seconds till rollover."

Hazelwood did not respond to a request for an interview through his lawyer. Cousins, the third mate, could not be located.

Several people saw Hazelwood drinking or smelled liquor on his breath in the hours leading up to the accident, according to state prosecutors who later charged him with operating a watercraft while intoxicated. Cousins, who commanded the ship for part of the illfated voyage, was not certified to pilot through the part of Prince William Sound he traversed, officials have said.

On tape, Hazelwood's conversation is mostly lucid and to the point. But when he speaks in the early hours even before the grounding it's in a monotone so slow and guttural it sounds as if the tape is being played at half speed. His speech is noticeably less clear than that of the Coast Guard radar operators he talks with, and of other people on the Valdez who take over the microphone from time to time.

Hazelwood occasionally slurs a word or begins a sentence with the wrong word, stops, and starts over. As the night wears on, his speech seems to improve, and by midmorning on March 24, as he consults with the captain of another tanker, his speech is clearer, faster and more normally inflected.

Ship found sea lanes quiet

The Exxon Valdez left the Alyeska tanker terminal shortly before 9:30 p.m. on March 23, bound for Long Beach, Calif., with 53 million gallons of North Slope crude oil in its tanks.

In addition to Hazelwood, the bridge crew included Cousins, helmsman Harry Claar, and Ed Murphy, a local pilot who would take the ship through Valdez Narrows, thought to be the most difficult part of the passage out of Prince William Sound.

At 9:25, the Exxon Valdez called the Coast Guard vessel traffic center to report it was under way. The speaker was not identified, but he was not Hazelwood.

The Valdez sailed west from the terminal for six miles along the sausage shaped bay called Port Valdez. At 10:17, it passed Entrance Island and made a left turn into the threemile neck known as Valdez Narrows, which is less than a mile wide at its tightest point.

The Narrows end at Tongue Point, where Prince William Sound opens out before a sailor, with the exit at Cape Hinchinbrook lying about 55 south, as the crow flies.

At Rocky Point, five miles out of the Narrows, Murphy, the local pilot, left the ship and Hazelwood made his first call to the Coast Guard.

It came at 11:25 p.m.

"We've, ah, departed the pilot, or disembarked the pilot, excuse me," Hazelwood said in a deep mutter, "and at this time hooking up to sea speed and ETA Naked Island 0100, over."

The last part of Hazelwood's message meant that he expected to pass by Naked Island, some 22 miles southwest of Rocky Point, at 1 a.m.

"Roger that, sir," said the Coast Guard radar operator, unidentified on the tape. "Request an updated ice report when you get down through there, over."

A tanker that had left Valdez a few hours earlier had reported that ice from Columbia Glacier had drifted into the shipping lanes, a common occurrence, and the radarman was asking Hazelwood to let him know if it was still there.

"OK," said Hazelwood. "I was just about to tell you that, judging by our radar, I will probably divert from, ah, the TSS and end up in the inbound lane if there's no conflicting traffic, over."

The TSS or traffic separation scheme was set up by the Coast Guard to separate tankers headed out of Valdez from those headed in.

From Rocky Point southwestward, the tanker route is divided much like a freeway. Outbound tankers travel in the west lane and inbound tankers east. Between them lies the median strip, known as the separation zone.

A tanker captain must notify the Coast Guard if he wants to leave his designated lane and enter the separation zone, or if he wants to leave the separation zone and enter the lane for oppositedirection traffic.

"No reported traffic," the Coast Guard told Hazelwood. "I've got the Chevron California one hour out and the Arco Alaska's, ah, right behind him but they're an hour out from Cape Hinchinbrook."

The Coast Guardsman was telling Hazelwood that the nearest inbound tanker, the Chevron California, was still outside the Sound and not due at Cape Hinchinbrook for another hour.

"That'd be fine, yeah," Hazelwood said. "We, we may end up over in the inbound lane (unintelligible). We'll notify you when we leave the TSS and cross over the separation zone, over."

"Roger that," said the Coast Guard. "Be awaiting your call."

At 11:31, Hazelwood called again to say he was leaving the outbound lane.

"At the present time, ah, I'm going to alter my course to two zero zero and reduce speed (to) about 12 knots to wend my way through the ice, and Naked Island ETA might be a little out of whack, but, once we're clear of the ice out of Columbia Bay, we'll give you another shout, over."

Tankers traveling down the outbound lane of the separation system steer a heading of about 220 degrees. By "twozerozero," Hazelwood meant he was turning left to a heading of 200 degrees. This course, if held long enough, would take him across the separation zone and then across the inbound lane.

"Roger that, sir, be awaiting your call," the Coast Guard answered.

Though Hazelwood had to cross both the separation zone and the inbound lane in order to hit the reef, he never reported doing either.

McCall said the controller was expecting a call from the tanker when it entered the inbound lane, as required by regulations.

A call from Bligh Reef

Hazelwood didn't call the Coast Guard again until almost an hour later, when he reported himself aground at 12:27 a.m. Most of what happened in that hour is still a mystery, but a few facts are known.

According to National Transportation Safety Board investigator William Woody, the Valdez made another turn, to 180 degrees, shortly after its 11:31 p.m. turn to 200 degrees. Between then and the grounding, Hazelwood gave control of the ship to Cousins, the third mate, and went below to his cabin, according to the Coast Guard. Cousins was instructed to gently steer the Valdez back into the shipping lanes, according to the Coast Guard.

When Cousins took over, the Valdez was almost a halfmile outside the inbound tanker lane, according to the NTSB. Hazelwood was back on the bridge when the last orders were given, Woody said, but it is unclear when he arrived.

At 12:27 a.m. after the ship had been aground for more than 20 minutes Hazelwood reported the grounding to the Coast Guard. His voice was even deeper and slower than before the accident.

"Yeah, this is the Valdez back," Hazelwood said in a low mutter. "We should be on your radar there. We've fetched up hard aground north of Goose Island off Bligh Reef and evidently we're leaking some oil and we're going to be here for a while."

There was a pause. Then the Coast Guard operator answered.

"Roger, are you just about a mile north of Bligh Reef?" the operator asked.

"Yeah, that's correct," Hazelwood said.

Hazelwood's position report of "north of Goose Island" is a subject of the NTSB investigation, according to board spokesman Alan Pollock.

While the Valdez was north northwest of Goose Island when it went aground, the island was nine miles away in the darkness, according to coordinates the Coast Guard provided.

Two islands were much closer. One of those was Reef Island, which lay less than a mile southeast of Hazelwood's tanker. The other, much larger, was Bligh Island, which lay a halfmile behind Reef Island.

Pollock said that NTSB investigator William Woody is examining the question of the Goose Island position report, but would go no further.

A former Coast Guard official and one who works there still disagreed about whether it was peculiar to use Goose Island as a reference point, given Hazelwood's position.

"Normally it wasn't an island or recognizable point of land that came up in normal traffic or conversation," said Jim Woodle, a former commander of the Valdez Coast Guard station. "He was actually west of Bligh Island."

Lt. Cmdr. Tom Falkenstein, one of two Coast Guard investigators who went out to the Valdez the night of the grounding, said he didn't think there was anything odd about the report."It's an approximate position that he was giving," Falkenstein said. "It's kind of the jargon."

At 12:31, the Coast Guard operator called the tug Stalwart and asked it to go to Bligh Reef to assist the Valdez. At 12:38, the Coast Guard asked about the Bligh Reef weather. Hazelwood reported drizzle, visibility 10 miles, 10 knots of wind, and slight seas.

After that, the operator asked the Chirikof, a boat used to ferry pilots to and from the tankers, to go down to Bligh Reef for a "reconnaissance" of the situation. He also asked for the Silver Bullet, another pilot boat, to come into Valdez to pick up Coast Guard personnel who would be going out to the ship.

At 12:42, the Coast Guard operator ordered the port closed to tanker traffic.

Cmdr. McCall made his first call to the Exxon Valdez at 1:07 a.m.

"This is the captain of the port, Cmdr. McCall," he said. "Good evening. Do you have any more of an estimate as to your situation at this time?"

"Problem with the third mate'

"Ah, not at the present, Steve," Hazelwood said. "Joe Hazelwood here. A little problem here with the third mate, but we're working our way off the reef. We've, ah, the vessel has been holed and we're ascertaining right now, we're trying just to get her off the reef and we'll get back to you as soon as we can."

What Hazelwood meant by "a little problem here with the third mate" is another of the mysteries still surrounding the grounding. He didn't explain on the radio, and nobody on the bridge that night has yet talked publicly about it.

Like the Goose Island position report, the "problem" with the third mate is under investigation by Woody at the National Transportation Safety Board, Pollock said.

"He is aware of them and they're part of his analysis," Pollock said. "But he has nothing to say about them."

When McCall learned that Hazelwood was trying to move the damaged tanker off the reef, he warned him to be careful.

"Roger on that," McCall said, sounding rattled. "I've got, you know, we've got all our, our, plan mechanisms in place to give you what assistance we can. You know, take it slow and easy and, you know, I'm telling you the obvious, but take it slow and easy and we're getting help out as fast as we can and I'd appreciate when you get around, if you can, give me a fairly good, if you can give me an update, whenever, as to the general location where you suspect (the damage) might be and, ah, and, ah, and, ah, the stability info, over."

"OK, we're (in) pretty good shape right now, stabilitywise," Hazelwood answered, "and, ah, trying to extract her off the shoal here. You can probably see me on your radar, and, ah, once we get under way, I'll let you know, do another damage control assessment."

At 1:59 a.m., McCall called the Exxon Valdez again for a status report.

"Any update, captain?" he asked.

A new voice, unidentified, answered.

"We're still surveying tanks, trying to assess the damage," it said.

"Roger," said McCall, "do you have capacity on board to internally transfer if you need to?"

"Yes, we could do that," the Valdez answered.

"OK, that's, obviously you know better than I do, but that's highly recommended if, once you've determined which tanks are holed, to drop the head if you can," said McCall, meaning he wanted to reduce the level of oil in the leaking tanks by moving oil to other ones.

"Yes, roger that," said the Valdez.

"Are you still working, trying to get off?" McCall asked.

"No, our engines are stopped right now," the Valdez said. "We're going to wait till there's a little more water underneath us."

If the Valdez did try again to free itself, there's no evidence of it on the tape.

At 2:25, the Coast Guard called the Chirikof, the pilot boat sent to reconnoiter the situation at the Valdez, and asked for a report.

"I just made a little survey around the ship here, around the edge of the shoal," the Chirikof answered. "There's quite a bit of oil extending down more than half, about half a mile or so south of the ship and quite a bit out that way. Looks like it's all heading that direction, too. Nothing headed north."

Then the Coast Guard verified with the Chirikof that the Bligh Reef light about a mile westsouthwest of the Valdez and the Busby Island light about three miles northnortheast were still functioning.

At 3:19 a.m. McCall was back on the radio, and got the first inkling of the magnitude of the black tide spreading out over Prince William Sound.

"Have you had a chance to detect whether or not any noticeable amount of oil has dropped out of any tanks and, if so, which tanks are they?" McCall asked.

Two minutes later, someone not Hazelwood on the ship called back with the answer.

"Ah, the initial figure is 138,000 and the chief mate's taking another check on it right now," the Valdez said, without specifying whether the quantity was in barrels or gallons.

"Which tank is that, or tanks?" McCall asked.

"Right now, our starboard slop tank, two starboard wing tanks, and possibly five center," the Valdez said.

"You said "starboard' ?" McCall asked, puzzled that the ship had not hit the reef from the side that runs parallel to the tanker lane.

"Roger," said the Valdez.

"Roger on that, and that was barrels, correct?" asked a gloomysounding McCall.

"That's correct," said the Valdez.

Daily News outdoors editor Craig Medred contributed to this story.

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