Opinions

Hope springs eternal for ANWR development. But don’t hold your breath.

Alaska seems on the verge of an economic mega-project with the pending opening a portion of the coastal plain of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to oil exploration. If most Alaskans get their "druthers," leases will be sold within a year; if not then, not long afterward. Under a best-case scenario proffered by Sen. Lisa Murkowski, the lease sales could raise $2.2 billion in federal revenue over 10 years, half of which would go to the state of Alaska. There are some significant challenges, and at least one report notes actual drilling is not expected for a decade. Still, the prospect of another oil bonanza dazzles many observers.

There have been mega-projects in Alaska's past, none bigger than the Alaska Railroad and the trans-Alaska pipeline. Some have been successes, several have been failures. The biggest failure was the Alaska Railroad.

That seems counterintuitive today, given the long history of the railroad and its familiar presence for most of Alaska's population. It's difficult to imagine at this great distance the boomer atmosphere of 1914 when the line was created. The Klondike rush had astonished everyone and awakened wistful investors to the possibilities of what was seen then as a new frontier. Enthusiasm ran rife, especially after the country's richest banker, J.P. Morgan, joined forces with the Guggenheim mining combine, also the largest in the country, to develop the Chitina copper deposits.

Grasping the unprecedented expanse of the Klondike phenomenon and seeing a copper deposit great enough to attract "Guggenmorgan," what could make Alaska more attractive? Congress became infected, too, and poured extraordinary funds into construction of the Alaska Railroad. They expected the route would bring the territory's wealth, envisioned as virtually limitless, to distant markets, and untold profits to investors.

It didn't happen. There wasn't gold or copper in every mountain, and the north country was harsh and expensive. Moreover, the Matanuska coal on which the Pacific Navy set its hopes, was disappointing: too watery and difficult to mine. Already in 1918, when the road was essentially complete, government assessors told Congress the bold truth: High expectations would not be realized, as Charles Wohlforth reminded in his centennial history of Anchorage.

The Alaska Railroad limped along through the 1920s and 1930s on annual, very grudging federal funding, accompanied by stringent management. Only the military buildup in 1942 and beyond helped the route show a profit. Congress was happy to unload it to the state in 1982.

The Alaska pipeline story is happier, of course. But there are interesting similarities and there were major challenges. There was the same initial enthusiasm following astonishment at the Prudhoe Bay discovery, a finding as unprecedented as the Klondike. But the environmental battle came close to stopping the pipeline altogether. Oil companies poured exceptional funds into construction of the line, which, originally projected to cost $900 million, penciled out at around $8 billion. Designers and builders found the northern environment not only expensive but also harsh. The derring-do of planners and construction workers on some segments — Thompson Pass, for example — has yet to be generally appreciated.

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Other mega-projects did not fare so well. The list of boomers waxing eloquent over the projected foundational role of the Matanuska Colony in making Alaska economically self-sustaining reads like a who's who of Alaska history. It didn't happen. Economies of scale defeat profitable commercial agriculture in Alaska still today. The same is true for manufacturing, even food manufacturing, as investors in several potato chip enterprises over the years could testify. Other mega-dreams that enjoyed mega-enthusiasm but didn't make it include the Rampart Dam on the Yukon River, the poorly conceived Project Chariot to test a nuclear device and the Lomen family's marketing of reindeer meat in the Lower 48.

What are significant issues with Arctic refuge drilling? Are there commercially viable deposits; will new technologies be truly cost effective? The most important is that the industry may not be all that interested. The reason is that the profit may not be "bankable," i.e., large enough to justify the cost, a problem that inhibits other Arctic investment.

Many Alaskans are pinning their hopes on the opening of the refuge. They might note that while hope springs eternal, it's not the same with results.

Steve Haycox

Steve Haycox is professor emeritus of history at the University of Alaska Anchorage.

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