Thursday marked the final day of testimony in the U.S. Coast Guard's marine casualty hearings, and with it, the last chance the public will have for a while to hear what caused the grounding of the Kulluk conical drilling unit in December.
While more information will be released eventually (the final report from the Coast Guard is expected to take up to a year), the picture is far from complete. Companion probes by the Department of the Interior and the Department of Justice are also under way.
Still, in nine days of testimony in Anchorage's Loussac Library, bits and pieces of what happened leading up to the grounding paints a larger story of what went wrong -- and when.
While the grounding and its salvage led to no injuries, death or any oil spill, it highlighted the challenges Royal Dutch Shell has encountered in developing an Arctic drilling program in Alaska. The Netherlands-based oil giant has spent more $4 billion in developing offshore leases, but has little to show for it.
The Kulluk investigation comes at a time when multinational oil companies are questioning the risks and rewards of hunting for crude in a delicate Arctic environment.
"The whole Arctic, especially the American Arctic, was set back because of Shell's issue," Choo Chiau Beng, the chief executive of Keppel, the world's biggest rig maker, told Reuters in a recent story titled "Oil Execs Tune Out Call of the Arctic."
With both the Kulluk and Noble Discoverer rigs, centerpieces of Shell's Arctic drilling program, under repair in Asia, Shell suspended its 2013 Arctic drilling program. So far, there has been no indication on whether they will return in 2014, or whether ConocoPhillips, which has carefully followed Shell's lead, will decide to explore its numerous leases in the region.
Here's a snapshot of what was learned over nine days of dense, detailed testimony at Anchorage Assembly chambers.
June 2012: Kulluks and Aiviq's first encounters
Preparations for the June 2012 tow from Seattle to Dutch Harbor was uneventful, thanks to "benign" weather, according to Capt. Marc Dial, tow master in charge of the first pairing of the Kulluk and the Aiviq, a new Edison Chouest built and operated tug designed to tow the Kulluk.
Dial and others testified that towing the Kulluk was unique, thanks the circular design of the 266-foot diameter drilling unit that has no propulsion system of its own.
"It's basically like towing a large saucer for a tea cup," Dial said during testimony.
During the investigation, small changes to the tow plan began to emerge. Most notable? A shackle connecting the tow line of the Aiviq to the Kulluk was upgraded from a strength of 85 tons to 120 tons. That shackle would fail six days into the Kulluk's 18-day journey from Dutch Harbor to Seattle, and start a series of seemingly coincidental mechanical failures that culminated in the grounding of the rig hours before New Year's Day.
November 2012: Aiviq engine fails
While the tow from Seattle to Dutch Harbor in June 2012 was uneventful, those that followed were dicier. During the tow through the Chukchi Sea as the rigs moved toward Deadhorse, they encountered a fierce summer storm. Despite some small water damage, there was seemingly no damage to the rigs or any other element of the tow setup.
However, on the return tow in November 2012 from Alaska's Arctic Coast back to Dutch Harbor, generators on the Aiviq stopped working, causing a short blackout. At the same time, the tug's No. 4 engine failed. With four engines – two on each side of the ship – propulsion was never lost, though the crew was unable to restart the engine. Why the engines failed was never addressed in testimony.
December 2012: Why leave now?
While the engine was repaired in Dutch Harbor, the two vessels prepared to depart for Seattle to conduct off-season repairs. Work needed to be done to the cranes aboard the Kulluk, work that couldn't be done in remote Dutch Harbor due to lack of infrastructure and able crew.
Another factor for moving? Avoiding potentially millions of dollars of taxes the company might incur by keeping the rigs in Alaska.
At the time of the move in December 2012, Shell's Alaska Operations Manager Sean Churchfield testified he didn't know how much the tax would be, only that it would be in the millions. He said that was one of the primary drivers for getting the Kulluk out of Dutch Harbor before the beginning of 2013.
Later on, it was learned that the tax would not have applied to the vessels, since the tax -- a 2 percent levy on all assets dedicated to oil and gas exploration, transportation and production in Alaska – only applies to vessels operating in-state. The Kulluk operates in federal waters on Alaska's Outer Continental Shelf.
Churchfield and others did testify that the weather window from Dec. 21 forward showed four days of good weather heading into the Gulf of Alaska and was one of a hierarchy of reasons the tow commenced.
Dec. 27: Shackle breaks, Aiviq's engines fail, Kulluk crew evacuated
Things were uneventful for the first week of the voyage, according to those aboard the vessels. On Christmas Day, crews barbecued on the Kulluk deck. But on Dec. 27, the shackle broke and the situation began to worsen.
Exactly why the shackle broke is unclear, since it now rests on the Gulf of Alaska floor. Questions focused on whether the tow line endured excessive strain Dec. 27, when the ships hit slightly choppy seas – 10 to 15 foot swells that typically are not concerning. By all accounts, there was no excessive strain.
The same day, the Aiviq was able to quickly reestablish an emergency towline while two other tugs, the Guardsman and the Nanuq, were sent out to serve as backups.
But later that night, at nearly 11 p.m., one of the Aiviq's engines failed, with the rest failing within hours after fuel injectors became mucked with bad fuel. Chief engineer Carl Broekhuis testified the an unknown fuel additive caused the bad fuel, which left a "slime" on the fuel filters. New fuel injectors were flown in and the good fuel was rerouted to bring all four engines back online.
Five months after the incident, Broekhuis and others involved with the operation said they still did not know what the additive was.
With sea conditions worsening, following the engine and tow line issues, managers looked to evacuate the 18-person Kulluk crew, who were becoming tired and weary as the ship bobbed back and forth. After one unsuccessful attempt, the Coast Guard evacuated all 18 off of the Kulluk via helicopter on Dec. 30.
Dec. 31: Alert given order to release
While four ships arrived on scene during various points, none managed to hang on to the Kulluk as seas worsened.
On the afternoon of Dec. 31, it was down to only the Aiviq and the Alert, a Crowley-operated tug boat, holding on to the Kulluk. As they attempted to move the rig closer to shore and into safe harbor, the Aiviq lost its tow line.
The Alert held on, working hard (at one point, its engines delivered 100 percent power).
While keeping those engines operating at maximum power, an alarm sounded, indicating that the engines were being overtaxed. A series of miscommunications at Unified Command -- the joint operation that included Shell, Noble Drilling, Coast Guard, state and local entities – led the group to believe the alarm indicated the Alert's engines had failed.
While that information was quickly corrected, managers led by Coast Guard Capt. Paul Mehler III, were convinced it was time to cut the Kulluk loose in order to protect the Alert's crew.
While the Alert captain testified that he thought the Alert could hang on longer in an effort to guide the Kulluk to a safer spot, he followed orders and cut the line.
Hours later, the Kulluk ran aground.
Contact Suzanna Caldwell at suzanna(at)alaskadispatch.com