THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
January 17, 2014
Remarks of President Barack Obama
Results of our Signals Intelligence Review
January 17, 2014
Washington, D.C.
As Prepared for Delivery –
At the dawn of our Republic, a small, secret surveillance committee
borne out of the "The Sons of Liberty" was established in Boston. The
group's members included Paul Revere, and at night they would patrol
the streets, reporting back any signs that the British were preparing
raids against America's early Patriots.
Throughout American history, intelligence has helped secure our
country and our freedoms. In the Civil War, Union balloon
reconnaissance tracked the size of Confederate armies by counting the
number of camp fires. In World War II, code-breaking gave us insight
into Japanese war plans, and when Patton marched across Europe,
intercepted communications helped save the lives of his troops. After
the war, the rise of the Iron Curtain and nuclear weapons only
increased the need for sustained intelligence-gathering. And so, in
the early days of the Cold War, President Truman created the National
Security Agency to give us insight into the Soviet bloc, and provide
our leaders with information they needed to confront aggression and
avert catastrophe.
Throughout this evolution, we benefited from both our Constitution and
traditions of limited government. U.S. intelligence agencies were
anchored in our system of checks and balances – with oversight from
elected leaders, and protections for ordinary citizens. Meanwhile,
totalitarian states like East Germany offered a cautionary tale of
what could happen when vast, unchecked surveillance turned citizens
into informers, and persecuted people for what they said in the
privacy of their own homes.
In fact even the United States proved not to be immune to the abuse of
surveillance. In the 1960s, government spied on civil rights leaders
and critics of the Vietnam War. Partly in response to these
revelations, additional laws were established in the 1970s to ensure
that our intelligence capabilities could not be misused against our
citizens. In the long, twilight struggle against Communism, we had
been reminded that the very liberties that we sought to preserve could
not be sacrificed at the altar of national security.
If the fall of the Soviet Union left America without a competing
superpower, emerging threats from terrorist groups, and the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction placed new – and, in some
ways more complicated – demands on our intelligence agencies.
Globalization and the Internet made these threats more acute, as
technology erased borders and empowered individuals to project great
violence, as well as great good. Moreover, these new threats raised
new legal and policy questions. For while few doubted the legitimacy
of spying on hostile states, our framework of laws was not fully
adapted to prevent terrorist attacks by individuals acting on their
own, or acting in small, ideologically driven groups rather than on
behalf of a foreign power.
The horror of September 11th brought these issues to the fore. Across
the political spectrum, Americans recognized that we had to adapt to a
world in which a bomb could be built in a basement, and our electric
grid could be shut down by operators an ocean away. We were shaken by
the signs we had missed leading up to the attacks – how the hijackers
had made phone calls to known extremists, and travelled to suspicious
places. So we demanded that our intelligence community improve its
capabilities, and that law enforcement change practices to focus more
on preventing attacks before they happen than prosecuting terrorists
after an attack.
It is hard to overstate the transformation America's intelligence
community had to go through after 9/11. Our agencies suddenly needed
to do far more than the traditional mission of monitoring hostile
powers and gathering information for policymakers – instead, they were
asked to identify and target plotters in some of the most remote parts
of the world, and to anticipate the actions of networks that, by their
very nature, cannot be easily penetrated with spies or informants.
And it is a testimony to the hard work and dedication of the men and
women in our intelligence community that over the past decade, we made
enormous strides in fulfilling this mission. Today, new capabilities
allow intelligence agencies to track who a terrorist is in contact
with, and follow the trail of his travel or funding. New laws allow
information to be collected and shared more quickly between federal
agencies, and state and local law enforcement. Relationships with
foreign intelligence services have expanded, and our capacity to repel
cyber-attacks has been strengthened. Taken together, these efforts
have prevented multiple attacks and saved innocent lives – not just
here in the United States, but around the globe as well.
And yet, in our rush to respond to very real and novel threats, the
risks of government overreach – the possibility that we lose some of
our core liberties in pursuit of security – became more pronounced. We
saw, in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, our government engaged in
enhanced interrogation techniques that contradicted our values. As a
Senator, I was critical of several practices, such as warrantless
wiretaps. And all too often new authorities were instituted without
adequate public debate.
Through a combination of action by the courts, increased congressional
oversight, and adjustments by the previous Administration, some of the
worst excesses that emerged after 9/11 were curbed by the time I took
office. But a variety of factors have continued to complicate
America's efforts to both defend our nation and uphold our civil
liberties.
First, the same technological advances that allow U.S. intelligence
agencies to pin-point an al Qaeda cell in Yemen or an email between
two terrorists in the Sahel, also mean that many routine
communications around the world are within our reach. At a time when
more and more of our lives are digital, that prospect is disquieting
for all of us.
Second, the combination of increased digital information and powerful
supercomputers offers intelligence agencies the possibility of sifting
through massive amounts of bulk data to identify patterns or pursue
leads that may thwart impending threats. But the government collection
and storage of such bulk data also creates a potential for abuse.
Third, the legal safeguards that restrict surveillance against U.S.
persons without a warrant do not apply to foreign persons overseas.
This is not unique to America; few, if any, spy agencies around the
world constrain their activities beyond their own borders. And the
whole point of intelligence is to obtain information that is not
publicly available. But America's capabilities are unique. And the
power of new technologies means that there are fewer and fewer
technical constraints on what we can do. That places a special
obligation on us to ask tough questions about what we should do.
Finally, intelligence agencies cannot function without secrecy, which
makes their work less subject to public debate. Yet there is an
inevitable bias not only within the intelligence community, but among
all who are responsible for national security, to collect more
information about the world, not less. So in the absence of
institutional requirements for regular debate – and oversight that is
public, as well as private – the danger of government overreach
becomes more acute. This is particularly true when surveillance
technology and our reliance on digital information is evolving much
faster than our laws.
For all these reasons, I maintained a healthy skepticism toward our
surveillance programs after I became President. I ordered that our
programs be reviewed by my national security team and our lawyers, and
in some cases I ordered changes in how we did business. We increased
oversight and auditing, including new structures aimed at compliance.
Improved rules were proposed by the government and approved by the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court. And we sought to keep
Congress continually updated on these activities.
What I did not do is stop these programs wholesale – not only because
I felt that they made us more secure; but also because nothing in that
initial review, and nothing that I have learned since, indicated that
our intelligence community has sought to violate the law or is
cavalier about the civil liberties of their fellow citizens.
To the contrary, in an extraordinarily difficult job, one in which
actions are second-guessed, success is unreported, and failure can be
catastrophic, the men and women of the intelligence community,
including the NSA, consistently follow protocols designed to protect
the privacy of ordinary people. They are not abusing authorities in
order to listen to your private phone calls, or read your emails. When
mistakes are made – which is inevitable in any large and complicated
human enterprise – they correct those mistakes. Laboring in obscurity,
often unable to discuss their work even with family and friends, they
know that if another 9/11 or massive cyber-attack occurs, they will be
asked, by Congress and the media, why they failed to connect the dots.
What sustains those who work at NSA through all these pressures is the
knowledge that their professionalism and dedication play a central
role in the defense of our nation.
To say that our intelligence community follows the law, and is staffed
by patriots, is not to suggest that I, or others in my Administration,
felt complacent about the potential impact of these programs. Those of
us who hold office in America have a responsibility to our
Constitution, and while I was confident in the integrity of those in
our intelligence community, it was clear to me in observing our
intelligence operations on a regular basis that changes in our
technological capabilities were raising new questions about the
privacy safeguards currently in place. Moreover, after an extended
review of our use of drones in the fight against terrorist networks, I
believed a fresh examination of our surveillance programs was a
necessary next step in our effort to get off the open ended
war-footing that we have maintained since 9/11. For these reasons, I
indicated in a speech at the National Defense University last May that
we needed a more robust public discussion about the balance between
security and liberty. What I did not know at the time is that within
weeks of my speech, an avalanche of unauthorized disclosures would
spark controversies at home and abroad that have continued to this
day.
Given the fact of an open investigation, I'm not going to dwell on Mr.
Snowden's actions or motivations. I will say that our nation's defense
depends in part on the fidelity of those entrusted with our nation's
secrets. If any individual who objects to government policy can take
it in their own hands to publicly disclose classified information,
then we will never be able to keep our people safe, or conduct foreign
policy. Moreover, the sensational way in which these disclosures have
come out has often shed more heat than light, while revealing methods
to our adversaries that could impact our operations in ways that we
may not fully understand for years to come.
Regardless of how we got here, though, the task before us now is
greater than simply repairing the damage done to our operations; or
preventing more disclosures from taking place in the future. Instead,
we have to make some important decisions about how to protect
ourselves and sustain our leadership in the world, while upholding the
civil liberties and privacy protections that our ideals – and our
Constitution – require. We need to do so not only because it is right,
but because the challenges posed by threats like terrorism,
proliferation, and cyber-attacks are not going away any time soon, and
for our intelligence community to be effective over the long haul, we
must maintain the trust of the American people, and people around the
world.
This effort will not be completed overnight, and given the pace of
technological change, we shouldn't expect this to be the last time
America has this debate. But I want the American people to know that
the work has begun. Over the last six months, I created an outside
Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies to make
recommendations for reform. I've consulted with the Privacy and Civil
Liberties Oversight Board. I've listened to foreign partners, privacy
advocates, and industry leaders. My Administration has spent countless
hours considering how to approach intelligence in this era of diffuse
threats and technological revolution. And before outlining specific
changes that I have ordered, let me make a few broad observations that
have emerged from this process.
First, everyone who has looked at these problems, including skeptics
of existing programs, recognizes that we have real enemies and
threats, and that intelligence serves a vital role in confronting
them. We cannot prevent terrorist attacks or cyber-threats without
some capability to penetrate digital communications – whether it's to
unravel a terrorist plot; to intercept malware that targets a stock
exchange; to make sure air traffic control systems are not
compromised; or to ensure that hackers do not empty your bank
accounts.
Moreover, we cannot unilaterally disarm our intelligence agencies.
There is a reason why blackberries and I-Phones are not allowed in the
White House Situation Room. We know that the intelligence services of
other countries – including some who feign surprise over the Snowden
disclosures – are constantly probing our government and private sector
networks, and accelerating programs to listen to our conversations,
intercept our emails, or compromise our systems. Meanwhile, a number
of countries, including some who have loudly criticized the NSA,
privately acknowledge that America has special responsibilities as the
world's only superpower; that our intelligence capabilities are
critical to meeting these responsibilities; and that they themselves
have relied on the information we obtain to protect their own people.
Second, just as ardent civil libertarians recognize the need for
robust intelligence capabilities, those with responsibilities for our
national security readily acknowledge the potential for abuse as
intelligence capabilities advance, and more and more private
information is digitized. After all, the folks at NSA and other
intelligence agencies are our neighbors and our friends. They have
electronic bank and medical records like everyone else. They have kids
on Facebook and Instagram, and they know, more than most of us, the
vulnerabilities to privacy that exist in a world where transactions
are recorded; emails and text messages are stored; and even our
movements can be tracked through the GPS on our phones.
Third, there was a recognition by all who participated in these
reviews that the challenges to our privacy do not come from government
alone. Corporations of all shapes and sizes track what you buy, store
and analyze our data, and use it for commercial purposes; that's how
those targeted ads pop up on your computer or smartphone. But all of
us understand that the standards for government surveillance must be
higher. Given the unique power of the state, it is not enough for
leaders to say: trust us, we won't abuse the data we collect. For
history has too many examples when that trust has been breached. Our
system of government is built on the premise that our liberty cannot
depend on the good intentions of those in power; it depends upon the
law to constrain those in power.
I make these observations to underscore that the basic values of most
Americans when it comes to questions of surveillance and privacy
converge far more than the crude characterizations that have emerged
over the last several months. Those who are troubled by our existing
programs are not interested in a repeat of 9/11, and those who defend
these programs are not dismissive of civil liberties. The challenge is
getting the details right, and that's not simple. Indeed, during the
course of our review, I have often reminded myself that I would not be
where I am today were it not for the courage of dissidents, like Dr.
King, who were spied on by their own government; as a President who
looks at intelligence every morning, I also can't help but be reminded
that America must be vigilant in the face of threats.
Fortunately, by focusing on facts and specifics rather than
speculation and hypotheticals, this review process has given me – and
hopefully the American people – some clear direction for change. And
today, I can announce a series of concrete and substantial reforms
that my Administration intends to adopt administratively or will seek
to codify with Congress.
First, I have approved a new presidential directive for our signals
intelligence activities, at home and abroad. This guidance will
strengthen executive branch oversight of our intelligence activities.
It will ensure that we take into account our security requirements,
but also our alliances; our trade and investment relationships,
including the concerns of America's companies; and our commitment to
privacy and basic liberties. And we will review decisions about
intelligence priorities and sensitive targets on an annual basis, so
that our actions are regularly scrutinized by my senior national
security team.
Second, we will reform programs and procedures in place to provide
greater transparency to our surveillance activities, and fortify the
safeguards that protect the privacy of U.S. persons. Since we began
this review, including information being released today, we have
declassified over 40 opinions and orders of the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court, which provides judicial review of some of our most
sensitive intelligence activities – including the Section 702 program
targeting foreign individuals overseas and the Section 215 telephone
metadata program. Going forward, I am directing the Director of
National Intelligence, in consultation with the Attorney General, to
annually review – for the purpose of declassification – any future
opinions of the Court with broad privacy implications, and to report
to me and Congress on these efforts. To ensure that the Court hears a
broader range of privacy perspectives, I am calling on Congress to
authorize the establishment of a panel of advocates from outside
government to provide an independent voice in significant cases before
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court.
Third, we will provide additional protections for activities conducted
under Section 702, which allows the government to intercept the
communications of foreign targets overseas who have information that's
important for our national security. Specifically, I am asking the
Attorney General and DNI to institute reforms that place additional
restrictions on government's ability to retain, search, and use in
criminal cases, communications between Americans and foreign citizens
incidentally collected under Section 702.
Fourth, in investigating threats, the FBI also relies on National
Security Letters, which can require companies to provide specific and
limited information to the government without disclosing the orders to
the subject of the investigation. These are cases in which it is
important that the subject of the investigation, such as a possible
terrorist or spy, isn't tipped off. But we can – and should – be more
transparent in how government uses this authority. I have therefore
directed the Attorney General to amend how we use National Security
Letters so this secrecy will not be indefinite, and will terminate
within a fixed time unless the government demonstrates a real need for
further secrecy. We will also enable communications providers to make
public more information than ever before about the orders they have
received to provide data to the government.
This brings me to program that has generated the most controversy
these past few months – the bulk collection of telephone records under
Section 215. Let me repeat what I said when this story first broke –
this program does not involve the content of phone calls, or the names
of people making calls. Instead, it provides a record of phone numbers
and the times and lengths of calls – meta-data that can be queried if
and when we have a reasonable suspicion that a particular number is
linked to a terrorist organization.
Why is this necessary? The program grew out of a desire to address a
gap identified after 9/11. One of the 9/11 hijackers – Khalid
al-Mihdhar – made a phone call from San Diego to a known al Qaeda
safe-house in Yemen. NSA saw that call, but could not see that it was
coming from an individual already in the United States. The telephone
metadata program under Section 215 was designed to map the
communications of terrorists, so we can see who they may be in contact
with as quickly as possible. This capability could also prove valuable
in a crisis. For example, if a bomb goes off in one of our cities and
law enforcement is racing to determine whether a network is poised to
conduct additional attacks, time is of the essence. Being able to
quickly review telephone connections to assess whether a network
exists is critical to that effort.
In sum, the program does not involve the NSA examining the phone
records of ordinary Americans. Rather, it consolidates these records
into a database that the government can query if it has a specific
lead – phone records that the companies already retain for business
purposes. The Review Group turned up no indication that this database
has been intentionally abused. And I believe it is important that the
capability that this program is designed to meet is preserved.
Having said that, I believe critics are right to point out that
without proper safeguards, this type of program could be used to yield
more information about our private lives, and open the door to more
intrusive, bulk collection programs. They also rightly point out that
although the telephone bulk collection program was subject to
oversight by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and has been
reauthorized repeatedly by Congress, it has never been subject to
vigorous public debate.
For all these reasons, I believe we need a new approach. I am
therefore ordering a transition that will end the Section 215 bulk
metadata program as it currently exists, and establish a mechanism
that preserves the capabilities we need without the government holding
this bulk meta-data.
This will not be simple. The Review Group recommended that our current
approach be replaced by one in which the providers or a third party
retain the bulk records, with the government accessing information as
needed. Both of these options pose difficult problems. Relying solely
on the records of multiple providers, for example, could require
companies to alter their procedures in ways that raise new privacy
concerns. On the other hand, any third party maintaining a single,
consolidated data-base would be carrying out what is essentially a
government function with more expense, more legal ambiguity, and a
doubtful impact on public confidence that their privacy is being
protected.
During the review process, some suggested that we may also be able to
preserve the capabilities we need through a combination of existing
authorities, better information sharing, and recent technological
advances. But more work needs to be done to determine exactly how this
system might work.
Because of the challenges involved, I've ordered that the transition
away from the existing program will proceed in two steps. Effective
immediately, we will only pursue phone calls that are two steps
removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization instead
of three. And I have directed the Attorney General to work with the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court so that during this transition
period, the database can be queried only after a judicial finding, or
in a true emergency.
Next, I have instructed the intelligence community and Attorney
General to use this transition period to develop options for a new
approach that can match the capabilities and fill the gaps that the
Section 215 program was designed to address without the government
holding this meta-data. They will report back to me with options for
alternative approaches before the program comes up for reauthorization
on March 28. During this period, I will consult with the relevant
committees in Congress to seek their views, and then seek
congressional authorization for the new program as needed.
The reforms I'm proposing today should give the American people
greater confidence that their rights are being protected, even as our
intelligence and law enforcement agencies maintain the tools they need
to keep us safe. I recognize that there are additional issues that
require further debate. For example, some who participated in our
review, as well as some in Congress, would like to see more sweeping
reforms to the use of National Security Letters, so that we have to go
to a judge before issuing these requests. Here, I have concerns that
we should not set a standard for terrorism investigations that is
higher than those involved in investigating an ordinary crime. But I
agree that greater oversight on the use of these letters may be
appropriate, and am prepared to work with Congress on this issue.
There are also those who would like to see different changes to the
FISA court than the ones I have proposed. On all of these issues, I am
open to working with Congress to ensure that we build a broad
consensus for how to move forward, and am confident that we can shape
an approach that meets our security needs while upholding the civil
liberties of every American.
Let me now turn to the separate set of concerns that have been raised
overseas, and focus on America's approach to intelligence collection
abroad. As I've indicated, the United States has unique
responsibilities when it comes to intelligence collection. Our
capabilities help protect not only our own nation, but our friends and
allies as well. Our efforts will only be effective if ordinary
citizens in other countries have confidence that the United States
respects their privacy too. And the leaders of our close friends and
allies deserve to know that if I want to learn what they think about
an issue, I will pick up the phone and call them, rather than turning
to surveillance. In other words, just as we balance security and
privacy at home, our global leadership demands that we balance our
security requirements against our need to maintain trust and
cooperation among people and leaders around the world.
For that reason, the new presidential directive that I have issued
today will clearly prescribe what we do, and do not do, when it comes
to our overseas surveillance. To begin with, the directive makes clear
that the United States only uses signals intelligence for legitimate
national security purposes, and not for the purpose of
indiscriminately reviewing the emails or phone calls of ordinary
people. I have also made it clear that the United States does not
collect intelligence to suppress criticism or dissent, nor do we
collect intelligence to disadvantage people on the basis of their
ethnicity, race, gender, sexual orientation, or religious beliefs. And
we do not collect intelligence to provide a competitive advantage to
U.S. companies, or U.S. commercial sectors.
In terms of our bulk collection of signals intelligence, U.S.
intelligence agencies will only use such data to meet specific
security requirements: counter-intelligence; counter-terrorism;
counter-proliferation; cyber-security; force protection for our troops
and allies; and combating transnational crime, including sanctions
evasion. Moreover, I have directed that we take the unprecedented step
of extending certain protections that we have for the American people
to people overseas. I have directed the DNI, in consultation with the
Attorney General, to develop these safeguards, which will limit the
duration that we can hold personal information, while also restricting
the use of this information.
The bottom line is that people around the world – regardless of their
nationality – should know that the United States is not spying on
ordinary people who don't threaten our national security, and that we
take their privacy concerns into account. This applies to foreign
leaders as well. Given the understandable attention that this issue
has received, I have made clear to the intelligence community that –
unless there is a compelling national security purpose – we will not
monitor the communications of heads of state and government of our
close friends and allies. And I've instructed my national security
team, as well as the intelligence community, to work with foreign
counterparts to deepen our coordination and cooperation in ways that
rebuild trust going forward.
Now let me be clear: our intelligence agencies will continue to gather
information about the intentions of governments – as opposed to
ordinary citizens – around the world, in the same way that the
intelligence services of every other nation does. We will not
apologize simply because our services may be more effective. But heads
of state and government with whom we work closely, and on whose
cooperation we depend, should feel confident that we are treating them
as real partners. The changes I've ordered do just that.
Finally, to make sure that we follow through on these reforms, I am
making some important changes to how our government is organized. The
State Department will designate a senior officer to coordinate our
diplomacy on issues related to technology and signals intelligence. We
will appoint a senior official at the White House to implement the new
privacy safeguards that I have announced today. I will devote the
resources to centralize and improve the process we use to handle
foreign requests for legal assistance, keeping our high standards for
privacy while helping foreign partners fight crime and terrorism.
I have also asked my Counselor, John Podesta, to lead a comprehensive
review of big data and privacy. This group will consist of government
officials who—along with the President's Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology—will reach out to privacy experts,
technologists and business leaders, and look at how the challenges
inherent in big data are being confronted by both the public and
private sectors; whether we can forge international norms on how to
manage this data; and how we can continue to promote the free flow of
information in ways that are consistent with both privacy and
security.
For ultimately, what's at stake in this debate goes far beyond a few
months of headlines, or passing tensions in our foreign policy. When
you cut through the noise, what's really at stake is how we remain
true to who we are in a world that is remaking itself at dizzying
speed. Whether it's the ability of individuals to communicate ideas;
to access information that would have once filled every great library
in every country in the world; or to forge bonds with people on other
sides of the globe, technology is remaking what is possible for
individuals, for institutions, and for the international order. So
while the reforms that I have announced will point us in a new
direction, I am mindful that more work will be needed in the future.
One thing I'm certain of: this debate will make us stronger. And I
also know that in this time of change, the United States of America
will have to lead. It may seem sometimes that America is being held to
a different standard, and the readiness of some to assume the worst
motives by our government can be frustrating. No one expects China to
have an open debate about their surveillance programs, or Russia to
take the privacy concerns of citizens into account. But let us
remember that we are held to a different standard precisely because we
have been at the forefront in defending personal privacy and human
dignity.
As the nation that developed the Internet, the world expects us to
ensure that the digital revolution works as a tool for individual
empowerment rather than government control. Having faced down the
totalitarian dangers of fascism and communism, the world expects us to
stand up for the principle that every person has the right to think
and write and form relationships freely – because individual freedom
is the wellspring of human progress.
Those values make us who we are. And because of the strength of our
own democracy, we should not shy away from high expectations. For more
than two centuries, our Constitution has weathered every type of
change because we have been willing to defend it, and because we have
been willing to question the actions that have been taken in its
defense. Today is no different. Together, let us chart a way forward
that secures the life of our nation, while preserving the liberties
that make our nation worth fighting for. Thank you.
McClatchy